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I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The Third District Court of Appeal has recently reached a decision
which definitely, albeit cautiously, places Florida's hat in the ring of
controversy surrounding the question whether a man may be tried for
first degree murder under a felony murder statute and at a later date
be indicted and tried for the felony which had undergirded the murder
charge. In State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein,' the defendant was indicted and
tried for first degree murder under the Florida felony murder statute
2
for the death of his co-participant in a robbery, who had been killed by
the intended victim. He was convicted of manslaughter, a lesser included
offense of the crime of first degree murder. Thereafter, the State sought
to prosecute the defendant on an information charging robbery. The
defendant's motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy was de-
nied, and he petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal for a writ of
prohibition. Judgment in prohibition was granted.'
With no Florida precedent directly in point, the court was thus
confronted with a difficult question involving philosophy as well as legal
analysis. A perusal of the decisions of other jurisdictions evidences that
the law is in a state of confusion, and when the problem arises the solu-
tion sometimes seems to turn on whether the deciding jurists are prose-
cution or defense oriented.
The basic question is easily understood. The law holds that a man
is not criminally responsible if he was not possessed of criminal intent
at the time of the crime with which he is charged. Thus, if X and his
accomplice intend to rob their victim, but in the stress of the encounter
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 184 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
2. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1965):
The unlawful killing of a human being . . . when committed in the perpetration
of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, abominable
and detestable crime against nature or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first
degree, and shall be punishable by death.
3. State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein, 184 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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the accomplice shoots the man, X can hardly be said to have intended
the homicide. Much less would he have intended that in fleeing the scene
his accomplice should be shot and killed by a pursuing policeman. X
intended only the robbery. But society abhors crimes of violence and has
devised a means to stiffen the possible penalty for those who commit
such crimes. Under the felony murder concept, originating at common
law4 and existing in all the states,' if a death occurs during the perpe-
tration or attempted perpetration of certain felonies, now usually spe-
cified by statute,' the intent to commit such felony is transferred to the
homicide, and all who participated in the felony may be prosecuted for
first degree murder.7 Since the specific intent to kill is conspicuously ab-
sent, the case for the prosecution must rest solely on proof that the de-
fendant did in fact participate in the felony and thereby place himself
within the gamut of the statute, so that the state may prosecute him for
first degree murder. The question is, having done so, may the prosecu-
tion then turn and have a second fling at the defendant by prosecuting
him for the felony which formed the basis for the murder charge? Does
this violate all our traditional prohibitions against trying a man twice
for the same offense?
The Glenn court cited section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of Florida, "no person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense," and flatly held that the prosecution of
Glenn for felony murder included trying him for the offense of robbery.
This is a position that the court was by no means required to take. Indeed,
the point is much litigated, with the majority of jurisdictions subscrib-
ing to view that there is no double jeopardy in such a situation.' Even
the district court cautiously stated that a strong consideration in its de-
cision was that the actual killing had not been done by Glenn. The court
declined to consider what its decision might have been in a case involving
a subsequent trial for the felony following conviction under the felony
4. Note, Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Former Jeopardy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV.
299-300 (1960).
5. Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 453, 456 (1955).
6. For a definitive survey of the types of felony murder legislation existing in this
country, see generally, A Survey of Felony Murder, op. cit. supra note 5.
7. For informative appraisals of the general felony murder concept see, Note, The Felony
Murder Rule-A Re-Examination, 5 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 172 (1965); and Note, A Survey
of Felony Murder, op. cit. supra note 5.
8. E.g. People v. Johnson, Cal. App. 2d 195, 153 P.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1944); Harris v.
State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); People v. Andrae, 305 Ill. 530, 137 N.E. 496
(1922) ; State v. Ragan, 123 Kan. 399, 256 Pac. 169 (1927) ; State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121
So.2d 244 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960) ; Commonwealth v. Crecorian, 264 Mass.
94, 162 N.E. 7 (1928); State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 33 S.W.2d 905 (1930); Warren v.
State, 79 Neb. 526, 113 N.W. 143 (1907) ; People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d
308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Erie County Ct. 1959), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 906, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1006
(1960), appeal denied, 9 N.Y.2d 862, 175 N.E.2d 818 (1961) ; State v. Orth, 106 Ohio App. 35,
153 N.E.2d 394 (1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 388, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958); Duvall v.




murder statute of one who, while engaged in the felony, had committed
the homicideY The problem is thus many-faceted, and the sharp conflict




All jurisdictions agree that a defendant should not be twice put in
jeopardy of his life or liberty for the same offense." In order to substan-
tiate a plea of former jeopardy, the defendant must show that there was
a former prosecution in the same jurisdiction for the same offense; that
he, the defendant, was in jeopardy on the first prosecution; that the
parties are identical in the present prosecution and in the former; and
that the prosecution of the particular offense on which the jeopardy at-
tached was such an offense as to constitute a bar to further prosecution.' 2
It is this last requirement that has caused disparity among the juris-
dictions, with the disagreement arising in the definition of "same offense."
Generally, two tests have been employed by the several states. The
courts most frequently rely on the "same evidence" test.' In the lead-
ing case of Blockburger v. United States,'4 the defendant committed
the single act of selling morphine, but he thereby violated two separate
statutory provisions. The court pointed out that each of the two offenses
required proof of an element that the other did not, and stated the rule
that:
... where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to deter-
mine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.' 5
9. State ex rel. Glann v. Klein, supra note 3.
10. The scope of this paper is primarily limited to the narrow question of the propriety
of a trial for the underlying felony after a prior prosecution for the crime of felony murder.
This is naturally immersed in much broader questions of the applicability of the doctrines of
former jeopardy and res judicata to criminal actions generally. The larger area is surveyed
in several excellent articles, of which the following are illustrative: Kerchheimer, The Act,
The Offense & Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Note, Double Jeopardy & the
Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN L. RE V. 79 (1938).
11. For a concise review of the development of the concept of double jeopardy see
Harrison, Federalism & Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human Rights,
17 U. Mmmai L. REv. 306, 307 (1963), and Note, Double Jeopardy & the Concept of
Identity of Offenses, op. cit. supra note 10, at 79-80.
12. State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So.2d 478, 480 (1944), aff'd., 156 Fla. 113, 22
So.2d 581 (1945).
13. This test originated in The King v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep.
455, 461 (Ex. 1796), where it was said that:
Unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted
upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the
first indictment can be no bar to the second.
14. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
15. Id. at 304.
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In the application of this test, some courts have said that to sustain a
finding of double jeopardy, it must be shown that the same facts that
would have been necessary to prove that the defendant committed one
of the two offenses would have been equally sufficient to sustain the
charge against him for the other offense. In other words, the proof of
the two offenses must be mutually interchangeable. If the indictment in
the first action was such that the defendant might have been convicted
in that action upon proof of the facts by which the charge in the second
action is sought to be sustained, the first action will bar the second.
Conversely, if the facts alleged in the second action would not necessarily
be sufficient to sustain the charge contained in the first indictment, the
first action will not bar the second.'6
A few courts employ the "same transaction" test instead of the more
popular same evidence rule. In State v. Mowser, 7 the leading case
dealing with this test, the defendant had been convicted of robbery and
was subsequently indicted for felony murder, for the killing of the rob-
bery victim during the perpetration of the crime. The court held that
the robbery conviction barred the felony murder action, because:
When such integral part of the principal offense is not a distinct
affair, but grows out of the same transaction, then an acquittal
or conviction of an offender for the lesser offense will bar a
prosecution for the greater. 8
It has been suggested 9 that the New Jersey court did not mean to imply
that all illegal acts committed by a single defendant in a single span of
time must be tried in the same action. The court said, "the legislature
has made the crime of robbery a constituent element of murder in the
first degree. ,. oSince robbery is thereby made a part of the crime of
murder, the entire crime is one legal transaction."
The states have not adopted one or the other of these tests exclu-
sively. Rather, they are used interchangeably in an effort to achieve
justice on an ad hoc basis. It has been proposed that the courts cease
to presume that all statutes are intended by legislatures to be cumula-
tively applicable, and seek instead to determine the particular interests
sought to be protected, thus perhaps avoiding technical evasions of the
intended effect of the prohibition of double jeopardy which sometimes
occur.
22
16. Supra note 12.
17. 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 At]. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
18. Id. at 483, 106 AtI., at 420.
19. Harrison, supra note 11, at 329.
20. State v. Mowser, supra note 17, at 482, 106 AtI., at 419.
21. Harrison, op. cit. supra note 11, at 327-30, and Kirchheimer, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 527-42, provide more extensive analyses of these tests.
22. Harrison, op. cit. supra note 11, at 329.
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B. Application of the Majority Rule
The most extensively reasoned case espousing the majority position
that there is no double jeopardy when the defendant is tried for both
the murder felony and the felony is People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutus-
ka.'3 The court, in utilizing the same evidence test, argued that proof of
a felony is not really evidence of the crime of felony murder, but is re-
quired merely as a kind of preliminary condition before evidence of
that crime may be held to sustain a conviction. The court reasoned that
separate and distinct acts were involved in the felony murder, although
the indictment had alleged only murder in the first degree. Proof of the
crimes of burglary and robbery could be used to infer criminal intent,
but such proof did not make these independent crimes an element of the
crime of murder in the first degree. Such proof did not constitute the
element of criminal intent, since by definition, no actual.intent to murder
is present in felony murder. Rather, proof of the underlying felonies was
only evidence of inferred criminal intent.24 The court cited People v.
Lytton,25 a decision by the late Justice Cardozo in which he reasoned
that in a felony murder prosecution, the felony is alleged solely to char-
acterize the degree of the crime, rather than as an essential element of
the crime. Homicide can only be characterized as murder if there is proof
of felonious intent, but when the defendant kills in the perpetration of a
felony, and the intent to kill cannot be proved, the intent to commit the
felony can be transferred to the homicide. It is for this reason that the
indictment need not charge that the homicide was wrought in the com-
mission of another felony. It is sufficient to state, as at common law,
that the defendant acted "wilfully, feloniously, and with malice afore-
thought."26 The court's reasoning seems clear as far as it goes and suf-
fices when the defendant himself did the killing. But what of the situa-
tion resulting when his accomplice,27 the victim, 28 a policeman,29 or ,a
chance passer-by commits the homicide? In such cases the felony does
far more than characterize the degree of the crime; it is the entire offense.
The Santangelo court did not discuss these possibilities.
23. 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350, (Erie County Ct. 1959), aff'd., 11 App. Div. 2d
906, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1960), appeal denied, 9 N.Y.2d 862, 175 N.E.2d 818 (1961).
24. Id. at 314, 192 N.Y.S.2d, at 357.
25. 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931).
26. Roberts v. State, 164 So.2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1964); People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221,
226, 129 N.E. 883, 884 (1921).
27. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. App. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130 (1965).
28. The felony murder doctrine can lead to extreme results, as in Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). In that case two men robbed a grocery store
and fled in opposite directions. The victim, owner of the store, followed one of the robbers
and killed him. The court felt that the intent element necessary to hold the surviving robber
guilty of first degree murder could be satisfied by use of the felony murder doctrine.
Pennsylvania carried the use of the felony murder concept almost to absurd lengths before
revising its position to narrow the use of the concept in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa.
486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
29. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955); contra, Commonwealth v. Redline,
supra note 28.
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In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned"° that
the felony is not an essential element of a felony murder charge. The
court argued that there is no need for a close relation between the felony
and the homicide, because the victim of the felony need not even be the
same person as the victim of the homicide, and the felony can be com-
mitted in one jurisdiction and the killing in another, with the only con-
nection between the two being the defendant's flight from the scene of
the felony to the location of the homicide. The court argued that the fel-
ony need not necessarily be directly included as an integral part of the
murder, but rather the two might merely be incidentally related. This
reasoning appears fallacious, since although there may be no direct rela-
tion between the two, the felony murder statute is not satisfied, i.e., the
crime of felony murder has not been committed, unless both the felony
and the homicide have occurred, and unless there is some distinct con-
nection between the two.3'
In summary of its reasoning, the Santangelo court said:
Proof of the commission of an underlying felony in a felony
murder case is a condition of the murder charge conviction but
is not an element of that crime. If it were an element of the fel-
ony murder, the elements of such a crime would be as various
as the underlying felonies might be.82
It is submitted that this is a specious argument. How an proof of such
felony be a condition of a murder charge and not an element of that
crime?
Other courts, which apply the same evidence test use a more sim-
plified approach to the double jeopardy issue,8 and stress the fact that
the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for the underlying felony
would not have been wholly adequate to support the earlier felony murder
prosecution.84 These courts note that "in proving a [felony] it can never
be important or necessary to show the murder of the person assaulted. 8 8
It is emphasized that the facts essential to sustain a murder felony charge
will also suffice to sustain a charge for the underlying felony, but the
converse is not true, since the facts supporting a felony such as robbery
or arson will not support a felony murder charge without proof of an
additional element, the homicide itself. These courts apply the rule that
the proof of either crime charged must be sufficient to sustain a convic-
30. State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
31. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1965), for example, requires that the killing must have occurred
during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of the specified felonies.
32. People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska, supra note 23.
33. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
34. State v. Ragan, 123 Kan. 399, 256 Pac. 169 (1927); State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199,
33 S.W.2d 905 (1930) ; Warren v. State, 79 Neb. 526, 113 N.W. 143 (1907).
35. Warren v. State, 79 Neb. 526, 531, 113 N.W. 143, 145 (1907).
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tion under the other charge, and therefore hold that the latter action is
not barred.86
C. Application of the Minority Rule
The minority position, that the second prosecution should be barred
under principles of double jeopardy, was stated by a New Jersey Court
utilizing the same transaction test. In State v. Greely,37 the court held
that the accused had, in an earlier felony murder prosecution, been ac-
quitted of a crime in which the felony charged in the instant prosecu-
tion was an essential ingredient. The felony murder charge had included
a prosecution for the felony. The Greely court pointed out that in felony
murder there is essentially no difference between the underlying felony
and the homicide, "it is really the part that jeoparized him for the whole,
a feature of the problem which cannot for a moment be overlooked. ') 8
Some courts have rejected this position, because they reject in prin-
cipal the same transaction test.89 It is held by the majority of jurisdictions
that the phrase "same offense" encompasses only the same crime, not
necessarily the same acts, circumstances, or situation out of which the
crime arises, and the rule against double jeopardy does not bar a sub-
sequent prosecution for a different crime resulting from the same acts.40
A single act can be violative of more than one criminal statute, and can
be prosecuted under each, so long as one is not an included offense of the
other.4' This seems unjust, since it can allow harassment of a defendant
by multiple trials for a single act, one of the evils sought to be prevented
by the rule against double jeopardy,42 but it is the law. Indeed, if such
prosecutions were forbidden, the problem dealt with by this paper would
be eliminated, since those jurisdictions allowing prosecution of a felony
after a felony murder action, do so primarily on the ground that although
the same act is involved, more than one offense or crime has been com-
36. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
37. 30 N.J. Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639 (Hudson County Ct. 1954).
38. Id. at 185, 103 A.2d, at 642.
39. People v. Johnson, Cal. App. 2d 195, 153 P.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1944); and cases cited
supra note 34.
40. E.g. State v. Bowden, supra note 12; State v. Moore, supra note 34.
41. Florida, with the majority, rejects the same transaction test, as illustrated in State v.
Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So.2d 744 (1947), in which it was held that a conviction on a charge
of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor could not be
used to bar a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter by the culpably negligent operation
of an automobile, although the latter charge grew out of the same occurrence as the former.
42. This is suggested in Harrison, op. cit. supra note 11, at 331:
[T]he state prosecutor should be required to bring all his theories of the crime in
one trial, because one of the major reasons for the proscription against double
jeopardy is to prevent harrassment of the individual by confronting him with the
prospect of multiple trials.
Kirchheimer, op. cit. supra note 10, at 534-42, advocates the concentration of all proceedings
for one act in the same trial by the replacement of the same evidence test with a modified
version of the same transaction rule, and provides a well-reasoned view of the problems
involved in such an approach.
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mitted. The point frequently overlooked by the courts is that the same
transaction test is only one of several rationales employed by those
courts holding with the minority. Totally apart from any stand the courts
may have taken against the same transaction rule as it applies to the
doctrine of former jeopardy generally, the second action may be barred
under existing law in those jurisdictions prohibiting subsequent prose-
cutions for offenses necessaily included in an offense adjudicated at an
earlier trial.
D. A Suggested Approach
This survey of the broad differences in approach to this problem by
the several jurisdictions indicates that some area of common ground or
a single test should be extracted from the cases if possible, to help clar-
ify the law on this point. It is suggested that whatever the test used to
determine identity of offenses, as a practical matter the problem of a
plea of former jeopardy should essentially draw into issue the question
whether under the murder indictment as it was drawn, the defendant
could have been found guilty of the underlying felony, i.e., whether he
was in fact put in jeopardy for that offense. Indeed, the cases, although
emphasizing one or another of the tests described, often at some stage
of the opinion do phrase the question in terms of the possibility of con-
viction for the felony under the terms of the earlier indictment. The Su-
preme Court of Georgia, in a well-reasoned opinion,43 discussed the same
evidence test, noting that its inadequacy to meet all possible contingen-
cies has caused the courts to develop exceptions to the rule. One such
exception, universally accepted under both presently used rules, provides
that regardless of whether a particular test is satisfied, when a previous
trial was for a major offense but under the indictment in that case the
defendant could have been convicted of the minor offense charged in
the second indictment, the second action should be barred as a violation
of the prohibition against double jeopardy. This is true even though
proof of some additional element may be required in either of the two
actions." The court went on to adopt a form of the same transaction
test to be used by Georgia courts, defining it in a helpful manner. Recog-
nizing that the words "same transaction" alone are of little help in an
effort to define the term "same offense," as it occurs in the double jeopardy
clauses, the court stated that this test as it applies to double jeopardy45
contains two facets: the transaction must be the same as a matter of fact
and of law. For purposes of this discussion, the court's discussion of
identity as a matter of law is important, and in part is as follows:
Accordingly, even where the two transactions are the same in
43. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941).
44. Id. at 116, 17 S.E.2d, at 578.




fact, it is also necessary for the defendant to plead and prove;
either (a) that the transaction charged in the second indictment
is an offense which is identical in law with that charged in the
first indictment, or else that under the actual terms of the first
indictment proof of the second offense was made necessary as
an essential ingredient of the offense as first charged; or (b)
that the transaction charged in the second indictment is an of-
fense which represents either a major or minor grade of the
same offense, of which the defendant might be convicted under
an indictment for the major offense.4"
The question thus becomes simply a matter of ascertaining whether
under the terms of a particular indictment for felony murder, as inter-
preted under the law of the jurisdiction involved, the defendant could
have been convicted of the felony with which he is later sought to be
charged. 7 This should be the essential inquiry, rather than the recipro-
cal query of whether the proof required under the second indictment
would sustain a conviction under the first, which lacks any logical basis
as a criterion for a successful plea of double jeopardy." Florida Statute
919.16 provides that "upon an indictment or information for any offense
the jurors may convict the defendant . .. of any offense which is ne-
cessarily included in the offense charged."4 9 Therefore, if the underlying
felony in a felony murder charge is a lesser included offense of the crime
of felony murder, the defendant in such a situation has certainly been
in jeopardy once for that offense.
In People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska0 the court recognized the
importance of this question. While acknowledging that in a felony mur-
der case all of the ingredients of the underlying felony must be proved,
the court defended its decision of allowing the second action by pointing
out that in New York the defendant in such a homicide case could not be
convicted of the independent underlying felony. This was because the
underlying felony was not required to be charged or mentioned in the
first degree murder indictment under the felony murder statute, and in
that case had not been so charged or mentioned. Obviously, said the
court, the defendant could not be tried for crimes not charged in the
indictment. And according to the reasoning of the court, the underlying
46. Harris v. State, supra note 43, at 118, 17 S.E.2d, at 579. (Emphasis added.)
47. Harrison, op. cit. supra note 11, at 339 reviews the Model Penal Code § 108(2)(b)
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), and suggests that under that provision of the Code, all necessarily
included offenses must be tried in a single prosecution. Citing State v. Mowser, supra note 17,
the author then offers the felony in a felony-murder prosecution as an example of a
necessarily included offense.
48. See text accompanying notes 16, 34, 35 and 36 supra.
49. For a discussion of the distinction between lesser included offenses and lesser degrees
of an offense divided into degrees, and the confusion arising from the failure of some courts
to distinguish the two, see Note, Lesser Included Offenses in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 341,
345-46 (1963).
50. People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska, supra note 23.
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felony is not an element of the crime of felony murder, so that it is not a
lesser included offense of which the defendant might have been convicted
under a felony murder charge. If the defendant could not have been con-
victed of the felony under the earlier indictment, there is no double jeop-
ardy upon a subsequent trial for that felony.51 In rejecting the lesser
included offense theory, the Santangelo court relied in part on a line of
decisions52 advocating the doctrine of allocation, which provides that in
order to support a felony murder charge, the felony must be separate from
the homicide to the extent that it cannot merge therein. If it were not for
this limitation, all felonious assaults producing death would become felony
murder, that is, first degree murder.5" According to this reasoning, the
felony, "must be so distinct from that of the homicide as not to be an
ingredient of the homicide, indictable therewith or convictable there-
under."54 It is for this reason that the Santangelo court felt compelled to
argue that the felony is not a generic part of the felony murder, but rather
is merely a condition necessary to be proved in order to show the essential
felonious intent, or characterize the degree of the crime.5 The logical con-
clusion from this analysis is that when a crime is so distinct from a simple
assault on the homicide victim that it will support a felony murder charge,
then it is too distinct to be a lesser included crime within the principal
of double jeopardy. It is submitted that this analysis at best could be
valid only in those jurisdictions whose law will support its basic premise
-that if the underlying felony were not considered substantively differ-
ent from the crime of felony murder, that all felonious assaults resulting
in death would be felony murder. In many states there is no such re-
quirement, since the crimes upon which a felony murder prosecution
can be based are specified by statute,56 and only those offenses will sup-
port such a charge. 7 But even under the statutes couched in more gener-
al terms, it would seem that the New York analysis approaches the
problem in reverse. As suggested in the opening lines of this article, the
felony murder concept was originated to provide heightened penalties for
those who commit crimes of violence; underlying felonies were not cre-
ated to provide the intent element necessary for a first degree murder
prosecution. If anything, the homicide characterizes the "degree" of the
felony, rather than the converse. Certainly, when the defendant did not
51. Ibid.
52. People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 226, 129 N.E. 883, 884 (1921); People v. Lytton,
257 N.Y. 310, 314-15, 178 N.E. 290, 292 (1931); People v. Huther, 184 N.Y. 237, 244, 77
N.E. 6, 8 (1906); Buel v. People, 18 Hun. 487, 493 (1879), aff'd., 78 N.Y. 492 (1879).
53. Note, Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Former Jeopardy, 26 BROOK LY L. REv. 299,
300 (1960).
54. People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska, supra note 23.
55. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
56. Supra note 6.
57. The Florida Supreme Court has recently pointed out the inapplicability of this
aspect of the New York position to a jurisdiction with a statute specifying particular
felonies. Robles v. State, 188 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1966).
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do the actual killing, not only is the felony an essential part of the offense,
it is the offense, raised to the level of a capital crime by a showing that
homicide was committed during its perpetration.
In State v. Calvo, a Louisana court stated that it deemed the true
test to be ... whether on the former trial the accused could have been
convicted of the crime charged against him on the second trial,' '5 but
held that the offences of conspiracy to commit robbery, and the crime
of robbery itself are not the same as a matter of law, and are not neces-
sarily included in the crime of felony murder. On a felony murder in-
dictment, said the court, a jury is powerless to return a verdict of guilty
of robbery or of criminal conspiracy.
The rationale in the Calvo decision appears to be based on the prem-
ise that the facts which will justify charges of criminal conspiracy and
robbery are distinct from those which will support a charge of murder,
ahd that the three crimes are therefore not identical, nor are the former
two merely lesser grades of the latter. This is certainly true, and pin-
points a major stumbling block in the path of any attempt to bar a felony
prosecution after a felony murder action. It is a truism that all felonies
which will satisfy the statutory crime of felony murder are factually
very distinct from the crime of first degree murder, making it appear
that they are always offenses separate and apart from that crime. Under
our present pleading practices, it is only required that the state charge
the defendant with an unlawful homicide with a premeditated design,
without mentioning the felony,5 9 which may subsequently be introduced
into evidence to show the intent requisite to sustain the offense charged.
It is submitted that this is poor procedure. The charge should be felony
murder, since the defendant often has had nothing to do with the actual
killing. His only crime was his participation in the felony, but because
a homicide occurred during the fracas, that homicide is alleged to height-
en the level of his crime, or, as previously suggested, to characterize the
degree of the felony. If the indictment were required to specify felony
murder, it would become more manifest that the facts required to sup-
port a charge for the felony are necessarily included in the facts required
to support a charge of felony murder.
In contrast to the Santangelo and Calvo decisions, the Greely court
seemed to recognize the proper function of a felony murder statute and
was not troubled by the lack of a robbery count:
Could [the defendant], under the indictment for murder and
regardless of its lack of a robbery count, have been convicted
of the robbery? Most certainly he could have been, for, . . . a
conviction for the murder would of necessity have been a con-
58. 240 La. 75, 78, 121 So.2d 244, 248 (1960).
59. Supra note 26.
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viction for the robbery, essentially and ingrediently. There
simply could have been no conviction for murder without the
jury's finding that defendant had perpetrated a robbery or had
been in the act of doing so. 6°
The Supreme Court of Michigan has indicated in strong obiter dictum6
that if presented with a proper factual situation, it would hold in accord
with the position taken in Greely. The court stated that the underlying
felony is an essential ingredient of the class of first-degree murder de-
fined in Michigan's felony murder statute. The felony and the murder
are considered a single act, and therefore an acquittal of either the felony
or the murder would bar a conviction for the other.
If the test of former jeopardy is to be whether the defendant could
have been convicted of the presently charged offense upon an earlier
indictment or information, then the Florida courts have a preliminary
question to answer before arriving at a solution to the problem of a felony
trial after a felony murder prosecution. Is the underlying felony a lesser
included offense of felony murder? Florida has not taken a definitive posi-
tion on any criteria which may be used in determining just what offenses
will be treated as lesser included offenses of a given crime.2 Thus
far, Florida courts have been content to approach the problem on an
ad hoc basis. Tests which on occasion have been used by the Florida
Supreme Court are whether "without the commission of the lesser of-
fense the greater cannot be committed,"63 and, more recently whether
the greater offense cannot be proved unless the lesser is proved. 4 Either
of these would be satisfied by the underlying felony of a felony murder
charge, indicating that a felony murder defendant in Florida could be
convicted of the felony on which the murder charge is based, regardless
of whether or not that felony is specifically charged in the indictment. 5
More specifically, in State v. Glenn, the Third District Court of Appeal
stated unequivocally that "prosecution of [the defendant] on the larger
crime included and involved trying him for the robbery offense."66 The
court suggested the simple argument advocated by this paper, that be-
cause the killing was not done by the defendant, his guilt or innocence
and therefore his jeopardy on the murder charge hinged on the outcome
of trial of the included offense of the felony. In such a fact pattern it
seems most unjust to allow the second action. The question left open by
60. Supra note 37, at 186, 103 A.2d, at 643.
61. People v. Miccichi, 264 Mich. 581, 250 N.W. 316 (1933).
62. For an excellent consideration of this aspect of the problem, see Note, Lesser
Included Offenses in Florida, op. cit. supra note 49.
63. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 397, 78 So. 340, 341 (1918).
64. State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1962).
65. FLA. STAT. § 919.16 (1965):
Upon an indictment or information for any offense the jurors may convict the
defendant . . . of any offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.




the court, concerning whether a subsequent prosecution should be allowed
following conviction under the felony murder statute of one who, while
engaged in robbery committed the homicide, is more difficult. Here it
is more tenable that two separate offenses, the murder and the felony,
have been committed. It is true that in Florida, for purposes of former
jeopardy, the words "same offense" mean the same crime, not merely
the same act or set of acts out of which a crime arose. 7 The state could,
if it chose, prosecute the defendant for murder,68 and subsequently charge
him with felony, regardless of the outcome of the first trial.69 But when
the crime alleged is felony murder, that is, when the state relies on
proof of a felony rather than proof of premeditation, the determining
factor is the participation in the felony, and when that issue has been
once litigated, with the defendant in peril of a conviction for that offense,
it is difficult to understand upon what basis a further adjudication of that
question could be justified. If it is allowed, then the state, by carefully
selecting its method of procedure, can circumvent the constitutional pro-
hibition against double jeopardy.
Because the state will normally charge the defendant with the most
serious offense of which it has evidence, the felony murder prosecution
will usually precede any attempt to prosecute the felony alone. But should
the prosecution for the felony occur first, or should there be a trial for
the felony before the victim dies as a result of the crime, thus raising its
level to felony murder, the same problem will exist in reverse. It would
seem that although it is arguable that this sequence is more offensive
to a sense of justice, since the defendant has never 'been in danger of a
first degree murder conviction, still his crime, namely participation in
the felony, has already been adjudicated, and the second prosecution,
necessarily hinging upon that participation, should be barred.7 °
67. State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So.2d 478 (1944), aff'd, 156 Fla. 113, 22 So.2d 581
(1945).
68. First degree murder in Florida is defined either in terms of felony-murder, or as
"the unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated design to
effect the death of the person killed or any human being . . .", FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1965).
There is nothing to bar the state from trying the murder without invoking the felony-murder
portion of the statute. Of course, the state may not wish to do this when it is unable to
prove just which of the defendants committed the actual homicide.
69. Florida has no bar to prosecution of two separate and distinct crimes committed by
the same acts. This is illustrated by King v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940), which held
that an acquittal on charges of aiding, counseling, and procuring a principal to burn a build-
ing, under a statute defining the offense of first degree arson, was not a bar to a prosecution
on charges of causing, aiding, counseling and procuring burning of buildings with intent to
injure the insurer thereof, under a statute defining the offense of burning to defraud insurer.
70. State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919), barring a
prosecution for felony murder on the ground that the defendant had already pleaded guilty
to a charge of the underlying robbery; Doggett v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 208, 93
S.W.2d 399 (Crim. App. 1935) holding that under a felony murder statute a conviction of
robbery bars a subsequent prosecution for a murder committed in the perpetration of the
robbery; State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490 (1833), holding that conviction of
arson of a dwelling house bars a later prosecution for the murder of one burned in the house.
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The Florida Supreme Court has held7' that the state is prohibited
"from first prosecuting the lower offense necessarily included in a high-
er and then prosecuting the higher."72 The Court stated that to hold
otherwise would violate the rule against double jeopardy, by allowing
the state to prosecute for each of the lesser offenses included in a higher
offense, progressively on up to the highest, thus placing the accused in
jeopardy repeatedly for one or more of the lesser included offenses.73
Therefore, if the Glenn rationale is followed, and the supporting felony
is held to be a lesser included offense in felony murder, there is prece-
dent to bar a felony murder action following a trial of the felony.
The Greely court was unequivocal on this point, arguing that be-
cause the felony and the homicide are essentially the same crime, former
jeopardy is applicable whether the lesser crime is first prosecuted and
the defendant is later indicted for the homicide,74 or whether the homi-
cide is first disposed of, and the lesser offense is later charged.75 The
court stated:
The mere order of events, that is whether the accused is first
put in jeopardy for the whole or for the part of the total offense
charged against him, can be of no moment .... The decisions
in this State put it beyond question that what violates the im-
munity is the separation into its components, for the purpose
of separate prosecution, of an episode that constitutes a single
criminal act; that is, plural prosecution for a single offense.76
In addition to the inquiry concerning whether it makes any prac-
tical difference which of the two prosecutions occurs the first in time, is
the similar question of whether there should be any distinction, for
former jeopardy purposes, between a verdict of 'guilty or one of not
guilty in the earlier action. It has been said that,
A conviction or acquittal of any given offense should 'bar a sub-
sequent prosecution for any lesser included offense. And if the
71. Sanford v. State, supra note 63.
72. Id. at 401, 78 So., at 342.
73. This position is advocated in Note, Lesser Included Offenses in Florida, op. cit. supra
note 49, at 349 which states in part:
Two types of situations exist in which the use of a defense of former jeopardy should
be considered. A conviction or acquittal of any given offense should bar a sub-
sequent prosecution for any lesser included offense. And if the given offense is itself
a lesser included offense of some more serious crime, then a subsequent prosecution
for that greater offense should be barred. (Emphasis added.)
74. In State v. Mowser, supra note 70, a prosecution for murder allegedly committed
duling a robbery was barred on the ground of double jeopardy because the accused had
earlier pleaded guilty to the robbery.
75. In State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927), the
accused had been prosecuted for a homicide which had resulted from his operation of a
motor vehicle in a criminal manner. Subsequently, the state sought to prosecute the
defendant for an atrocious assault and battery committed upon a second victim of the same
criminal act. Applying the same transaction test, the court refused to allow the second action.
76. State v. Greely, supra note 37, at 184-85, 103 A.2d, at 642.
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given offense is itself a lesser included offense of some more
serious crime, then a subsequent prosecution for that greater
offense should be barred. 77
Most of the decisions pertaining to this point actually deal with
crimes divided into degrees. If a defendant is tried on an indictment
charging the highest degree of an offense, and is convicted of the degree
charged or of a lower degree of that crime, the judgment will bar any
further action both for higher78 and lesser79 degrees of the crime. If the
verdict is for acquittal, such acquittal is of the highest degree and all
lesser degrees.8" A felony, of course, is not a lesser degree of the crime
of felony murder; it is presented by this paper as a lesser included of-
fense of that crime. But analogizing from the well developed law sur-
rounding crimes statutorily divided into degrees, it would seem that if
the felony murder action is prosecuted first, and if in fact the felony is
a lesser included offense, so that the defendant is in jeopardy of a convic-
tion for that offense, then regardless of whether the verdict is for con-
viction or acquittal, the subsequent action should be barred.
If a defendant is tried on an indictment charging a lesser degree
of a crime, and is convicted of that degree or a lower degree, that con-
viction would bar a subsequent prosecution for that degree, a lower
degree, 8' or a higher degree,82 and an acquittal would bar a prosecution
for that degree or a higher degree.8" Thus it will be seen, again analog-
izing from crimes of degrees, that if the underlying felony is first tried,
the defendant should be able to plead that judgment to bar a subsequent
action for felony murder, regardless of the verdict in the first action.
In addition to the provisions barring multiple jeopardy, some states
also prohibit multiple punishment for a single offense. 4 This further con-
fuses the felony murder imbroglio. In Florida, a court may not inflict
77. Note, Lesser Included Offenses in Florida, op. cit. supra note 49, at 349. (Emphasis
added.)
78. State ex rel. Landis v. Lewis, 118 Fla. 910, 160 So. 485 (1935).
79. Note, Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy in Florida, 2 U. FLA. L. Rav. 250, 254
(1949); See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 283(b) (1961).
80. Note, Lesser Included Offenses in Florida, op. cit. supra note 49, at 349. This is
because FLA. STAT. § 919.14 (1965) provides that the judge must charge the jury that it may
return a verdict of guilty of any lesser degree of the crime charged. Logically then, an
acquittal in Florida is an acquittal of the degree charged and all lesser degrees; contra, Note,
Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy in Florida, op. cit. supra note 80, at 254, suggesting that an
acquittal of murder in Florida will not bar a prosecution for a lesser degree of crime in the
same category.
81. Note, Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy in Florida, op. cit. supra note 80, at 254;
See generally 22 c.j.S. Criminal Law § 283(b) (1961).
82. Sanford v. State, supra note 63.
83. Ibid.
84. E.g., NEW YoaK PExAL LAW, § 1938 (1944):
An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by
different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions, but
not under more than one; and a conviction or acquittal under one bars a prosecu-
tion for the same act or omission under any other provision.
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two punishments for the same offense. 5 This would suggest that, having
been tried for felony murder and subsequently indicted for the underly-
ing felony, the accused could rely on the rule against multiple punishment
in addition to, or as an alternative to, the prohibition against double
jeopardy. On the other hand, this rule does not apply where more than
one crime is committed in the same affray. 6 Therefore, the defendant
must hurdle the same legal barriers regardless of which of these two de-
fenses he attempts to avail himself. A jurisdiction that considers the
underlying felony a separate offense for purposes of double jeopardy is
most likely to do the same with regard to the rule against multiple pun-
ishment.87
Certainly, the pressing concern which has caused so many courts
to strain for a rationale which will permit prosecutions which are at best
open to attack under well developed principles of double jeopardy, is
the cogent fear that criminals will go unpunished, and the desire to pro-
tect society from those injustices which sometimes occur when skilled
defense attorneys find loopholes. The Greely court acknowledged these
fears, but reasoned that in the tradition of our constitutional system oc-
casional injustice must be tolerated to insure the security afforded by
safeguards such as the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court
phrased this proposition well:
Though the immunity against double jeopardy is universally
recognized as fundamental, constitutionally and at common
law, it can in truth be fundamental only as it is fundamentally
applied. Its ideal, like that of all the great guarantees, includ-
ing the right of trial by jury itself, is to be found in its salutary
design and in its equal availability to all men. The immunity
is not ordained to achieve a uniformity of moral perfection
in its results. Its operation is not contingent upon a relation to
happy circumstance. It is not designed to work poetic justice
in particular cases, but rather to restrain the sovereign power
in all cases. And if upon occasion it works to suppress a crim-
inal prosecution and so, as it might be, results in a disedifying
frustration in whole or in part of punishment for crime ... it is
because the lesser evil is to conserve the great institute by hav-
ing it rule the case, rather than to repudiate it by permitting
the reverse. The suppression of prosecution is necessarily the
protective function of the guarantee. The incomparably greater
evil would be in the larger frustration, which it is the solemn
duty of the court to prevent. Compromising and adaptive deci-
sions might forestall the occasional use of this ancient safe-
guard for the complete or partial defeat of a culprit's penalty,
85. Ex parte Bosso, 41 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1949).
86. Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474 (1931).
87. This is discussed in Note, Double Jeopardy: Prosecution for Underlying Felony
Following Acquittal for Felony Murder, 9 BUFFALo L. REv. 378, 381 (1960).
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but not without so transforming or reducing the safeguard as
to permit the sovereign power in this matter of double jeopardy
to be and become a standing and established menace to all.88
It is important to note that the Greely court made these remarks in jus-
tification of the inequity which had resulted from the application of the
principle of double jeopardy on behalf of the defendants in cases decided
earlier in that jurisdiction. In none of these cases was the principle sought
to be applied to prevent prosecution of the underlying felony after a
felony murder prosecution, but rather, the cases cited by the court dealt
either with an earlier prosecution for the felony, and a barring of the
later attempted felony murder prosecution,89 or with the barring of a
prosecution for an assault upon a person who had been injured by the
defendant's operation of a motor vehicle in a criminal manner, where
the defendant had earlier been tried for homicide for the death of another
victim of the same criminal act. ° Had the state wished a first degree
murder conviction in the first two cases, it could have prosecuted the
defendants under the felony murder statute in the first instance, rather
than seeking to divide what was essentially one criminal act into two
separate crimes. The situation in the third decision discussed by the
court could similarly have been avoided by prosecution of all aspects
of the crime in the first action. But the court felt that even these fact pat-
terns, and the resulting possible injustice, must be tolerated to preserve
the inestimably valuable safeguard against double prosecution for the
same offense. Surely it is much easier to understand the application of
the principle to a situation when the exact act, i.e., the participation in
a felony, has been once prosecuted.
III. RES JUDICATA
The foregoing discussion points up a related problem, yet to be
considered. Does the felony murder indictment in fact call into issue
the exact questions which would be considered in a trial for the felony
alone? If so, there is a second safeguard available to the defendant, that
of res judicata. Indeed, some courts faced with this kind of situation
have taken this second route, or have discussed both former jeopardy
and res judicata in resolving the question. The doctrine of res judicata
is sometimes either overlooked in criminal actions, or is swallowed up
in a general consideration of the broader doctrine of former jeopardy,
and therefore inadequately explored. Despite this general neglect, the
doctrine is unquestionably available in criminal trials.91
In its broadest form, res judicata covers the same area already ade-
88. State v. Greely, 30 N.J. Super. 180, 191, 103 A.2d 639, 645 (Hudson County Ct.
1954).
89. State v. Mowser, supra note 70; State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
90. State v. Cosgrove, supra note 75.
91. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
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quately protected in criminal actions by the principle of former jeopardy.
That is, where the same offense already once litigated is charged against
the defendant for the second time, he may interpose a plea in bar either
of former jeopardy or res judicata. But the doctrine of former jeopardy
can only be used to bar a second trial for the same offense. Collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, applies equally to separate and distinct of-
fenses, or causes of action. Therefore, in those jurisdictions holding that
in felony murder the murder and the felony are separate offenses, mak-
ing former jeopardy inapplicable, collateral estoppel, an aspect of res
judicata, may be used to block the second action by showing that one
or more issues drawn in question by the charges were in fact necessarily
litigated and decided by the court in the former actionY2 The problem
presented when this kind of analysis is made is caused by the use of gen-
eral verdicts in criminal actions. When a general verdict of guilty is
returned, it indicates that all issues have been decided in favor of the
prosecution. But when the verdict is not guilty, it is difficult to establish
which of the essential elements were not sufficiently established by the
prosecution.9'
A well-reasoned Georgia opinion, Harris v. State,94 with a factual
situation similar to Santangelo and Greely reached the conclusion that
the second action should be barred, as in Greely, but confined its discus-
sion to the doctrine of res judicata. The court rejected former jeopardy
as a rationale for its decision because it felt, in line with the majority of
jurisdictions, that the offenses of murder, even under a felony murder
statute, and of a separate felony, are not the same as a matter of law, and
that the indictment charging only murder under such a statute does not
make proof of the felony an actual ingredient of the crime of murder.
Because of this, and because a conviction for robbery could not have
been secured under the felony murder indictment in Georgia, the court
reasoned that the doctrine of former jeopardy was not applicableY5 In-
stead, it turned to collateral estoppel, and cited Freeman's work on
Judgments to the effect that when the crimes charged are different, ren-
dering a plea of former jeopardy unavailable, a prior criminal judgment
is nevertheless res judicata on every matter which was in issue and actu-
ally or necessarily determined by the court. And although an acquittal
may have been returned under an indictment charging an apparently
different offense, still that judgment may be used to sustain a plea of
92. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942):
Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the
parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action...
See generally, Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991, 997-98 (1943).
93. Note, Felony Murder Acquittal Held Not To Bar Subsequent Prosecution For
Underlying Robbery, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 816, 818 (1959) provides a discussion of these
principles.
94. Supra note 43.
95. Id. at 119, 17 S.E.2d, at 580.
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former acquittal by evidencing that the defendant could not be guilty
of the crime presently charged without having been guilty of the offense
for which he was acquitted." This, reasoned the court, could be applied
to provide for the situation resulting when the law of the jurisdiction
would preclude a conviction for the felony alone under a felony murder
charge. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the facts of the
Harris case, the court summarized its decision:
In the former trial for murder there was not the slightest pre-
tense of justification on the part of the defendant. The whole
contention in that case centered upon the one single question
whether the defendant participated with another in the murder
and robbery of the deceased. If he did, he was necessarily guilty
of murder. By acquitting him the jury necessarily found that
he did not participate in the transaction. This was the sole issue
that was tried and determined. It is now sought, after such a
solemn determination, to test again the same issue, and to undo
the necessary effect of the former judgment by adjudicating
that the defendant did in fact participate in the robbery and
murder, from which the jury has already absolved him. Since
it undisputably appears that the defendant could not be guilty
of the present charge without also being guilty of the crime
of which he has been tried and acquitted, he cannot now be put
in jeopardy for the purpose of again adjudicating the issue
which has already been determined in his favor. 7
Some courts, however, reject this theory when the verdict in the
felony murder trial was for acquittal, even though the only defense of-
fered by the defendant in that trial was an alibi."8 One such opinion is
State v. Barton,9 decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. In that
case, the defendant had been acquitted in a trial for felony murder of
a death occurring during the course of a robbery, and he entered a plea
of former acquittal. In rejecting his contention the court reasoned that:
In the murder prosecution, the appellant's defense of alibi and
the various related matters of fact . . . were not actually or
necessarily adjudicated, nor can it be said that the issues were
limited, as appellant contends. Every material allegation of the
information was placed in issue by the appellant's plea of not
guilty, and the state had the burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.10 It is not possible to determine whether the jurors
96. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGmENTS, § 648, at p. 1364 (5th ed. 1925).
97. Supra note 43, at 121, 17 S.E.2d, at 581. (Emphasis added.); accord, People v.
Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y.S. 538 (1912).
98. It should be noted, however, that in the Harris case, supra note 43, the jury had
returned an acquittal, and the only defense offered had been an alibi.
99. 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
100. This is supported by State v. Orth, 106 Ohio App. 35, 38, 153 N.E.2d 394, 398
(1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 388, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958):
The record is silent as to the issues upon which the murder case was tried. How-
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returned a verdict of acquittal because they credited the testi-
mony in support of appellant's alibi, or for the reason that
they found the state's evidence insufficient as to one or more
essential elements of the offense charged. They could have ut-
terly disregarded all of the testimony adduced by the appellant
in his defense and yet have returned a verdict of not guilty. The
verdict and the judgment based thereon were not, therefore,
res judicata as to appellant's alibi, nor as to any other particu-
lar fact. They were res judicata only as to the ultimate fact that
appellant was not guilty of the crime of which he was ac-
cused."0'
This argument has merit, since it is indeed impossible to determine from
a general verdict of acquittal just which were the deciding issues, and
collateral estoppel requires that the facts to which the doctrine is ap-
plied must not only 1) have been at issue in a former trial, but must
have been 2) determined by that tribunal, and 3) necessarily so deter-
mined in order for the court to reach its decision. 02 The first require-
ment is easily met in the situation in question, but after an acquittal it
is impossible to know whether the second has been met, since the ver-
dict may have been based not on the jury's finding that the defendant
did not participate in the felony, but rather on their belief that although
he did participate in the felony a murder was not committed in the per-
petration of that felony,'0 8 or possibly their belief that the felony itself
had not been sufficiently proved. And, since it cannot be known whether
the second requirement is met, a fortiori the third is not satisfied, as
the decision could have been made without any determination on the
issue of alibi. In a jurisdiction following this reasoning a formidable bar-
rier is raised in the way of the defendant.
It is possible, however, to have a factual situation in which it can
be shown that the jury in the first action resolved the crucial issue of
the defendant's participation in the felony in his favor. This is the case
when there are multiple defendants and one is found guilty and another
found innocent. This can easily occur, since in many felony murder ac-
tions there are multiple offenders, only one of whom did the actual kill-
ing, while the others are being tried for murder solely because the state
alleges their presence and participation at the scene of the crime. This
ever, the nature of the charge involved a number of essential elements constituting
the crime of murder while in the perpetration of a robbery, which the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Failure upon the part of the state to
prove any one of the essential elements required a verdict of acquittal. Failure of
the defendant to deny or dispute any of the issues involved would not relieve the
state from the necessity to prove all the essential elements constituting the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added.)
101. State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 240-41, 105 P.2d 63, 67 (1940).
102. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943).
103. This is pointed out in Note, Felony Murder Acquittal Held Not To Bar Subsequent
Prosecution For Underlying Robbery, op. cit. supra note 93, at 820.
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is illustrated by State v. Ragan,10 4 a Kansas case, in which one defendant
was found guilty of murder committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a robbery, and a second defendant, was acquitted on the
basis of his defense that he had fled the scene before the murder was
committed. Upon his subsequent indictment for robbery, the second
defendant pled his former acquittal in bar. Although the ultimate issue
of former jeopardy was resolved against the defendant, the court stated
that the jury in the murder case had resolved the questions of fact as
to the defendant's presence and connection with the murder in his favor.
This is easily understood, since the jury must have believed that a mur-
der had been committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of a robbery, or they could not have convicted the first defendant, and
believing that, the only way they could have justified an acquittal of the
second defendant was by deciding that he had in fact not been present
at the time of the murder. This would indicate that collateral estoppel
might have at least limited application even in those jurisdictions which
normally reject it on the rationale of the Barton decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law in this area is clearly unsettled. This is true partly because
the mandate against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution 0 5 has not yet been held to be incorpor-
ated in the Fourteenth Amendment, °6 which does not itself expressly
contain such an injunction. Thus there is a complete lack of uniformity
among the jurisdictions, with the majority holding that a trial for the
underlying felony is not barred by former jeopardy when the defendant
has been previously tried for felony murder. However, res judicata is a
distinct rule of law, universally recognized, and not dependent upon any
constitutional mandate. One aspect of that doctrine, collateral estoppel, has
been held by some jurisdictions to bar the second action.'0 7 It is submitted
that the Third District Court of Appeal is to be commended for reaching a
just conclusion in State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein.0 Regardless of what
rationale is chosen by a court, it would seem that only by a strained and
technical legal contrivance can such an action be permitted. Manifestly,
the occurrence upon which both actions must be based is one and the
same, and as the steady movement toward the complete revision of
pleading and practice in the courts of this country' indicates, and as
104. 123 Kan. 399, 256 Pac. 169 (1927).
105. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . ."
106. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
107. The availability of res judicata as a separate rule of law applicable to this problem
is well expressed in State v. Orth, 106 Ohio App. 35, 47, 153 N.E.2d 394, (1957) (dissent),
appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 388, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
108. Supra note 66.
109. A concise summary of this reform process is provided in WairnT, HFADBOOx OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS §§ 66-68 (1963).
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our crowded dockets urge, it is socially desirable to insure that all legal
questions involved in a single event are decided by a single court with
all of the facts surrounding that occurrence before it.110 And surely it
is morally desirable to insure that no man must answer to the law twice
for what is essentially a single offense.
110. This is advocated in Note, Double Jeopardy: Prosecution for Underlying Felony
Following Acquittal for Felony Murder, op. cit. supra note 87, at 382.
